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Introduction.
A. The Problem of the Thesis: the Y/ay in which Royce
undertakes a Solution of the Problem of Evil.
The subject of this thesis is Royce 's greatment
of the Problem of Kvil . Obviously, much that is quite
pertinent to the subject could be written which this paper
cannot develop in full, jj'or this reason it seems best to
limit the material to a condensed but intimate description
of Hoyce '8 aporoach to and suggested solution of the problem
of evil, with a discussion of those points of Hoyce' s system
which are most necessary for a complete understanding of
the particular tonic which the subject of this thesis suggests.
Royce' 8 absolutist ic position and his treatment of
the subject of individuation are selected as two points from
which the problem may best be approached. Hoyce ' s general
idealistic position is discussed indirectly under the other
headings.
r^vil is treated under th6 general subject of
"Royce and the Problem of Kvil" and, more specifically,
under the sub-headings, "The Place of i^vil in the Philosophy
of Royce,** "Moral iivil," and "The Idea of Universal Harmony."
The first of these is introductory to the other two sections
which deal with moral evil and natural evil respectively.
There is a brief section in conclusion by way of
general criticism and personal comment. Criticism is not
entirely excluded from the rest of the thesis, but it is
hoped that the unity will be interrupted less by placing

the balk of the criticism at the end.
The purpose which has obtained in the thesis in
general has "been to present a brief though intelligent
treatment of the way in which Royce undertakes a solution
of the problem of evil. One who is quite familiar with
the philosophy of Royce might turn immediately to the
section which bears more directly on the question of evil,
but th6 first two sections of the thesis have seemed an
indispensable background.
B. Sources of the thesis.
1. The Works of Royce.
Royce' s works have be6n reviewed for his discussions
of the problem of evil and for a general view of his whole
system. For the most complete bibliography of the writings
of Royce to date one may consult the one prepared by Benjamin
Rand in connection with the Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce
on his Sixtieth Birthday , The bibliography of this thesis
does not assume completeness: it only gives the v/orks of
Royce which Dear most directly on the problem of the thesis.
a. His books which bear on the subject.
ghi World and the Individual is Royce ' s most
comprehensive work, and generally accepter! as his best.
Others of his books have reference to the problem of evil,
—
especially the studies of Godd and Evil, Religious aspects
of Philosophy
,
and, to moral evil, The philosophy of Loyalty
and volume one of The Problem of Christianity. "The problem
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of Job" in Studies of Good and ^vil is, perhaps, the most
systematized and condensed discussion of Royce 's view on
the problem of evil.
The other books of Royce have been referred to
at the points at which they bear most directly on this
thesis, and a reference to the notes, in which the various
sections of the paper have been designated, will give a
relatively useful list of the books which bear most
directly on each section.
The World and the Individual is especially
recommended for its usefulness in any study of Royce'
s
treatment of the problem of evil because of the detailed
index which is to be found at the end of the second volume.
It really ought to be supplmented, however, by the other
books which have been suggested. Religious Aspects of
Philosophy
,
especially chapters jLI and XII, is essential
to a clear understanding of just how Royce arrives at his
position, and the other books which have been mentioned
in connection with moral evil will help to make clear that
phase of the problem of evil.
b. iTie articles and other writings of Royce which bear
on the subject.
There are a number of valuable articles of Royce
which are useful in connection with this problem. These are
cited in the notes and in the bibliography. One will find,
however, that most of Royce' s articles in magazines, and
articles which have appeared in pamphlets or manuscript,
i
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are duplicated in his books with bat slight changes, in
his books, which number fourteen volumes on philosophy-
alone, there is to be found practically th6 whole of his
best thought, at least so far as it was put in written form.
2. The works of Royce's critics.
There is a great range of criticism on Koyce
including those who follow him to some extent and a very
great number of those who find fault with certain points
in his system. His absolutistic position is sufficient to
evoke severe criticism from some who on this account would
invalidate his whole system. Others criticize his absolutism
but think that it is also V6ry necessary to show the specific
reasons why they do not accept other points in his vsystera.
There is not only a wide range of criticism of Koyce, but
there is also a very great amount of criticism, much of it
severe, against his Bystera.
a. The more sympathetic critics.
Royce is not without those who appeciate him.
Many who do not agree with him admire greatly his gifts
and ability as a philosopher. A great many are willing
to agree that he has spoken some of the very best words
which absolutism has to ofier.
There are two especially who interpret Koyce'
8
philosophy sympathetically. Mary Whiton Calkins m her
Persistent problems of Philosophy and The Good Man and the
Good has shown herself to be a disciple of Koyce. She does
c
a great deal to interpret Koyce appreciatively. The present
writer has found her interpretation of Royce '8 position on
the prob lira of evil valuable to this thesis, as also other
of her contributions.
The brief though intelligent treatment of Koyce '8
position on God, freeaom, evil, and immortality found in
W. K. Wright's A Student 's Philosophy of Religion was
valuable in the preparation of this thesis. Wright is
a sympathetic critic of Koyce even though his philosophical
position is different from that of Koyce.
b. Others who comment on Koyce ' s philosophy, and especially
his treatment of th6 problem of evil.
There are many who have written on Koyce' 8 philosophy.
Those who came into contact with him at Harvard University
giv6 insights into his system which are valuable. George
oantayana in his book, Character and opinion in the United
States
,
gives a stimulb-t ing criticism though it is none too
lenient. Others who are rather severe, nevertheless aid
one in arriving at Hoyce's views. Two dissertations which
proved useful were, The Principle of Individuation in the
Philosophy of Josiah Koyce prepared by J. H. Philp of
Yale University and Josiah Koyce ' s Philosophy of Keligion
by P. E. Johnson of Boston University. 1 An article of
the latter writer on the subject, "Josiah Royce: Theist
or Pantheist" in the Harvard Theological Review2 contributed
to an interpretation of Royce' s approach to the God of
Christian theism.
€i
!
C. Method of This Thesis.
The method of the thesis has already he en hinted
at. Although it seems necessary to go into other phases
of Royce's system as well as the part which deal with his
treatment of the problem of evil, an effort has been made
to treat the other subjects subordinately and revelantly
to the main topic. By the time one has reached the third
and fourth sections, it ib the hope of the writer that one
may be prepared to see the naturalness of Royce's position
on evil and, at the same time, have a knowledge of Royce's
system which will allow him better to criticize Royce's
position on the problem of evil. The final critical section
has been made brief, for the thesis does not include in
its purpose more than an appreciate statement of Royce's
position.
4
Z« Royce 1 s Absolutism.
A. The Basic Place of Absolutism in Royce' s System.
1. He held to this view in all of his philosophy.
One of the most fundamental notions of Royce was
that of the Absolute to which he held in one form or another
throughout all of his writings. Critics my accuse Royce of
making changes in his view of the nature of the Absolute,
but they surely cannot find him ever doubting the Absolute.
Royce says that the wise shall live by postulates^
and one of the postulates to which Royce held most strongly
was that of an Absolute Self or an Absolute Thought. His
varying moods might assign to this Absolute different names,
and the needs for which the developments of his philosophical
system called might even change to some extent the signifi-
cance of the Absolute, but there was no departure from the
absolute idealism to which Royce very early gave his
allegiance
.
It must not be thought that Royce was simply a
synthetic philosopher in spite of the fact that he did wish
to conceive of the world order idealistically and in spite
of the almost encyclopedic breadth of his intellectual
4
attainments to which many bear witness. One readily
realizes, before he has gone far in any of the books of
Royce, that the author of that book is a man who is
struggling with reality and agonizing over the facts which
make life difficult to explain. The zeal of the man for
truth was not secondary to his devotion to the doctrine of
idealism.
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2. His absolutist almost amounted to a passion with him.
It has been suggested that Royce's was in part
an esthetic bias for an Hegelian Absolute. 5 However true
this may be, it is no less true that Royce's adherence to
absolutism was part of a moral conviction. Santayana says
that Royce "was heir to the Calvinistic tradition; piety
in his mind consisted in trusting divine providence
[implicitly] ..... N° He also added that "hie conscience
7
spoiled the pantheistic serentity of his system." However
true the connection of Royce's absolutism with religious
conviction may it, it is certainly true that he earnestly
sought an appreciation of the demands of the ethical ideal.
It is notably true that, after the contention that his
views in The Conception of God were fatal to human freedom,
Royce spent much of his energy reconciling morality with
his Absolute and in making a place in hiB absolute idealism
for moral endeavor. That his Absolute was weakened is
hardly to be denied, but that he really departed from his
devotion to the idea of an Absolute is hardly true. When
one has appreciated the extent of Royce's devotion to the
theory of an Absolute, he has gone a great way toward an
intelligent appreciation of Royce and an understanding of
his whole system.
B. Transcendent Elements in Royce's Absolute.
Transcendence means existence apart from and
as no part of a datum which is under consideration.

Transcendence of God means the existence of God apart from
and as some other than nature or persons, or both.
There are some elements in Royce's Absolute which
are transcendent in the sense of being supra-mundane. In
some respects the Absolute is set apart from the world and
possesses characteristics not like those of the material
world nor yet like other selves. Though this is not the
predominant note in the conception of the Absolute, it is
yet an important one. Those aspects, then, in which the
Absolute goes beyond its parts shall be considered.
1. The element of timelessness in the Absolute.
a. This gives to the Absolute an eternal perspective.
Human beings live in a temporal order, and they
find it a great handicap to their thinking and whole
perspective. It is not so with the Absolute, according
to Royce. He thinks that "the eternal insight observes
the whole of time, and all that happens therein, and is
eternal only by virtue of the fact that it does know the
ft
whole of time." The very fact that the Absolute does have
suci a comprehensive view of the whole prompts Royce to
give to it the titles "all-knower" and of "absolute
Mind." Royce treats the time-transcending power of the
Absolute so seriously that he says, "All the questions as
to oar deeper relations to the universe ar6 bound up in
this problem of Time and eternity."9 This idea of an
"Eternal Consciousness" which is related to the "whole
€
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of the world's events, precisely as our human consciousness
is related to a single melody or rhythm"-^ which may be
comprehended and appreciated us a whole, is the key to
the Hoyeian Absolute.
b. 'fimelessness means that finitude would not act as a
blinder.
Ihe events of the temporal order are so seriously
divided with reference to any temporal self that there is
always an incompleteness and uncertainty •** The Absolute
labors under no such handicap. This is t-he real element
of transcendence in Royce* s Absolute. "God rises above
finite details to hold them in perspective." 12 P. B*
Johnson distinguishes this as internal transcendence as
against any external transcendence, the latter of which
Royce did not have in his system.
2. Goodness not only prevails in the Absolute, but it
is the very nature of the Absolute.
Inasmuch as Royce ascribes to his Absolute good-
ness, goodness is also a transcendent element in the
Absolute for Royce admits that evil has a real existence
in finitude. Here again the issue goes back to temporal
considerations. Through temporal distinctions the
Absolute escapes the ascription of any evil to itself.
6. Royce uses the Absolute to solve the problems of
finite limitations, ignorance and error.
"Our ignorance, our fallibility, our imperfection,
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and.... error" reveal God: "these things, therein we taste
oar finitude, are what they are because they mean more
than they contain, imply what is beyond them.... assure
us of the reality of that fulfilment which is the life
13
of God." Royce builds up a very careful argument for
the existence of God from this foundation, Everyone,
for all practical purposes, will agree that error exists.
.Because of its very existence there must be a truth from
which it differs. In accordance with his idealism, Koyce
goes on to .show that nothing can exist apart from a mind
which knows it.
There is an "all knower," an "universal Thought"
in which there iB "absolutely organized experience," and
this is equivalent to reality. "Reality is the expression
of a single system of thought, the fulfilment of a single
conscious purpose, or the realm of one internally harmonized
Experience."^4 The Absolute thus has a place just where
human limitations cause a natural and necessary break.
It is through the Absolute that there can be seen a
perfection of perspective. The very fact that th6 finite
mind can only go so far, and that man's false ideas stand
in need of correction by the point of view of a larger
v/hol6 of experience, leads ufc on to the conception of a
larger whole of experience, to a complete experience,
finitude in all of its forms oi'ferb to hoyc6 the most
convincing proof of the existence of an absolute.
The divin6 will stands ir. contrast to the human
fI
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will. Aside from considerations of how there can be human
T7ill with an all-inclusive divine Will, hoyc6 speaks of
the whole of time as "expressing a single plan an Will. M^
In every way, then, the Absolute rises above the
finite. It might well be called a unified self-sufficient
whole. On these points Royce is quite insistent, however
much he may bring his Absolute in touch with the infirmities
of finitude. And to this extent Royce's Absolute is tran-
scendent .
C. Immanence of the Absolute.
1. The Absolute includes the whole natural world.
Although it has been seen that there is a sense
in which Royce's Absolute is transcendent, there is an
6ven greater immanence of the Absolute. By imnanence
is meant the extent to which the Absolute is inherent
in the universe. There shall be considerer, first, the
extent to which the Absolute is immanent in the natural
world, and then, the extent to which the Absolute is
immanent in man.
Royce insists most emphatically at times on
what would seen to be, very simply, pantheism:
Whose is all this beauty that thou enjoyest in art,
this unity that thou seekest to produce in thy state,
this truth that thou pursuest in thy thought? All
this is in God and of God. I'hou hast never seen,
or heard, or touched, or handled, or loved anything
but God. (16)
One can hardly doubt that Royce means to make his absolute
immanent. The only difficulty comes in seeking to Reconcile
«
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some of Hoyce's other tendencies with each a statement.
It is quite significant in this connection to
note that Royce never did concern himself greatly with
the problem of creation. This is entirely in line with
his pantheistic emphasis. He could not conceive of the
separation of creator and product: all was one with him.^ 7
The immanence of the Absolute so set the stage
for a consideration of the question of the existence of
evil that Royce could find no easy dualistic outlet, but
must either confine himself to an illusory theory of the
nature of evil or else find some way of swallowing up
evil in a larger whole. The latter alternative he chose,
but not apart from other importance considerations to which
attention will be turned later. Suffice it to say, at
this point, that good and evil, order and apparent disorder
in the universe, are all, in some sense a part of the
Absolute. Hoyce accepted such an Absolute and took
account of the consequences.
2. The Absolute includes man.
idhoyce's view has been designated as panpsychic:
that is to say, the view that all nature has a certain
aliveness or vital composition. At least, it must be
admitted that Hoyce accepts the tenet of the panpsychist
in holding that there is not a cleavage to be made between
the organic and the inorganic, but rather that the
inorganic is instinct with vital processes as well as
.1
L
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the organic. Man is a part of this whole: he is animated
by the Absolute; he is a part of the Absolute.
a. The Absolute feels with man.
Royce considers his Absolute as a conscious
Self inclusive of all reality. In his later writings
Royce emphasized the element of human solidarity; in
his earlier writings the idea of the Absolute being
consentient with man was present in spite of the greater
emphasis on the Absolute. In The World and the Individual
Royce expresses himself thus:
If Being is a final whole of experience, there must
be thfc t experience of which it is the whole, th&t
striving of which it is the finality, that imperfection
of which it is the completion.... nothing that is
known to the finite is lost in the Absolute. (19)
The Absolute, so to speak, "is crucified and bleeds" 20
80 much is "the toil and suffering of the world a part
of it." The Absolute, in the language of the plain
man, is the one who hears men's cries. So insistent
was Royce upon the fact that the Absolute strives along
with men that some of his critics say that he comes to a
God with finite aspects striving to attain the goal of
his perfection. 21 Royc6 would most certainly have denied
this, out he would still have insisted that the Absolute
did include man's experience inasmuch as it included
all of experience, else it would be "less and not more
than we.
"
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b. The Absolute does not have the finite limitations
of man.
It was with some difficulty that ftoyce made a
place in his AbBolute for individual selves, but it was
most natural for him to turn his thoughts back to the
Absolute as replete and transcending the limitations
of finitude. He spoke against the anthropomorphisms
which men use in his famous illustration of the pigeons.
We are prone to assign to God our limitations because we
find Him so revealed to us in the self-consciousness.
God, the Absolute, on the other hand, goes far beyond
human limits because He is not bound by human finitude.
His consciousness infinitely transcends our own. God
riBeB above time and other finite details to hold them
in perspective. At this junction, one will recall the
discussion, earlier in this thesis,^ of the transcendent
aspects of Koyce ' s Absolute.
Hoyce in his Spirit of Modern Philosophy calls
the Absolute a Self, "more definitely conscious than we
are" a"id yet a Self which dwells "beyond the seeming
wreck and chaos of our finite problems. " The absolute
Self rises above time-space limits to a realm of entirety
all its own.
In sum, let hoyce's words speak his own conclusions.
God is imnanent in the finite, because nothing is which
is not a part of his total self-expression. He is
transcendent of all finitude because the totality of
finite processes is before him at once while nothing
finite possesses true totality. (24)
cV
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D. Theistic Klements in Koyce's Absolute.
It is altogether natural that Koyce's position
as a theist should be called in question. This is all
the more the case when one sees that Koyce himself, at
least in one stage of his writings, is quite indifferent
as to whether theism or pantheism is his position. It
is at least obligatory upon one who comes to Koyce
critically to examine what are the theistic elements
in his philosophy before simply passing judgment on his
pantheism. There would appear to be a growing theistic
element in the philosophy of Koyce which shows itself
moet noticeably in his later writings.
1. To what extent personal.
One may say that the extent of Royce's theistic
attachment may be determined by the extent to which he
ascribed personality to the Absolute: at least it is a
cue for deciding upon Koyce's position.
a. The changing attitude of Koyce toward a World be If,
from Absolute Thought.
"The clearest advance toward theism is the
attribution of fuller personality to the absolute,"
Johnson, speaking of Koyce, tells us. 25 In his first
book, The Keligious Aspects of philosophy
,
Royce's
Absolute has the title of Infinite Thought, or simply the
Infinite, iieven years later, in The Spirit of Modern
Philosophy , the Absolute has greater personal characteristics
i
ascribed to it. ilot only is thought an attribute of the
Absolute in a very real sense, but the element of divine
will and divine feeling come into Royce* s Absolute. fj?he
title by which he now approaches his Absolute is that of
the Self or the World Self. Whatever attributes Koyce
gives to his Absolute, he always gives in full measure.
He is especially insistent on this point when the
attributes are also human for, if the Absolute possesses
them at all, He must either possess them in infinite
and complete degree or else be "less and not more than
we." The Absolute, then, when it becomes for Royce a
self, comes into a full possession of its qualities
of selfhood.
Royce develops the individuality of (rod, and
he does not stop with simply calling his Absolute a self.
He is quite ready to call it a person. The only way that
the Self can transcend tne limitations of finite selfhood
Koyce goes on to say, 26 is by being a greater self. The
Self possesses a consciousness which is beyond that of the
human, and, since it includes persons and is itself
27
conscious, "it is at the very least a person."
b. principle of the beloved Community.
In the later writings of Royce one comes upon
the idea of the "Beloved Community." Is this to be
completely identified with his Infinite Thought and
his World Self? Many would hold that Royce makes this
(
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identification. In some places h6 would certainly seem
to make this identification. When he speaks of "this
essentially social universe" as being "the sole and
supreme reality,— the Absolute.... ", it would seem
that the identity is complete. It is, however, possible
that he meant by this statement to emphasize social values
as the supreme values and to stress the social aspects
of the world structure which is the Absolute, Mary W.
Calkins seems to make a fair interpretation of Royce at
this point: she does not think that he identifies the
Absolute Self with the Universal Community.
His [Royce' s] meaning, as I conceive it, is more
exactly stated when he says that "the divine life
is expressed in the form of a community" and that
"the whole real world is the expression of one
divine process.... the process of the Spirit." (29)
Royce would seem to indicate that his Absolute
really transcends the church or the Beloved Community
even as it transcends the world. The Community is one
of the most perfect expressions of God, but yet God is
in relation to it as Spirit. It is that aspect of divine
being which has been recognized in the Christian doctrine
of the Holy Spirit. "The divine Spirit" it is which
constitutes "the unity and life of this community....
Christian thinkers should not have difficulty in under-
standing the distinction which Royce tried to make.
It is not to be questioned that Royce' s thinking
developed and changed, and one may even consider this
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emphasis on the Beloved Community as a final stage of
his philosophical development, bat it is hardly fair to
say that his Absolute Self was now nothing but the Beloved
Community. The Absolute remained, but the Community was
the form of its expression.
The Beloved Community is not a self as the
Absolute Self is. It is supra-personal, something which
behaves and is treated as if it were a person. Indeed
it is the agency of man's salvation. The Community is
the expression of the life and tie spiritual significance
of the whole of the universe.
It may be quite fairly said that the Community
has the tendency to displace in emphasis the remoter
Absolute 31 if one still bear in mind that God is the
spirit dwelling in the Beloved Community and not merely
the Community itself.
2. Development from a theiBtically indifferent position
to one of theistic attachment.
In the epilogue of his first book, The Religious
Aspects of Philosophy
,
Royce says,
And now we must add that we are quite indifferent
whether anybody calls this Theism or Pantheism. (32)
On the other hand, we find the following statement in The
Conception of God
,
page 49.
In brief, then, the foregoing conception of God
undertakes to be distinctly theistic, and not
pantheistic.
A continuation of this latter sentiment is to be found
(I
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with increasing decision in the rest of his books.
There are many who deny to Royce a theistic
position. It wo old seem that, in the light of Royce's
uncertainty in the matter, there might be reason for not
recognizing him as a theist.
.First of all, it is best to make clear the
meaning of the two terms, theism and pantheism.
Pantheism is the doctrine that the universe, taken
or conceived as a whole, is God. Theism may be
differentiated as the belief in the existence of a
God who transcends the universe in his personality and
yet is immanent in it in his knowledge and action.
If one will reflect upon the nature of the
Absolute as already described, he will see that there
are to be found the elements of theism. The ways in
which Royce's Absolute is transcendent were indicated
in the section devoted to the consideration of the
"Transcendent elements in Royce's Absolute." Though
some have held to the contrary, Royce's Absolute certainly
would seem to be unified enough. Indeed, he reduces all
material things and finite selves to states of the .absolute.
In the section of this thesis which deals with the
individual it will be seen that there is a freedom of
choice in the individual which sustains a theism on that
point. On the other hand, the personal element in the
Absolute has already Deen noted, and the attribution of
fuller personality to the Absolute was his clearest
(J
f
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advance toward theism.
Prom the time that he reached a view giving central
place to the individuality of God and man, he
considered hie philosophy distinctly theistic. (be)
His conscience spoiled the pantheistic serenity of
his system.... (34)
3. Identification of his Absolute with the God of
Christian tradition by Hoyce.
Royce sets out in his Religious Aspects of
Philosophy by stating very plainly that he is not going
to be bound by any constraints of Christian orthodoxy,
and that he has no relation to any creed. His Universal
Thought, he further says, "is not the God of very much
of traditional theology." However, Koyce soon began
seriously to estimate his Absolute in terras of the God
of Christianity. He found that he was nearer to the God
of Christianity than his earlier independence of thought
had allowed him to admit. He made frank acknowledgment
of this point, moreover, in his address on the "Conception
of God," at the conclusion of which he says,
For my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave
of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist
that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely
meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and all
the unessential accidtnts of religious tradition,
identical with the inevitable outcome of reflective
philosophy.
Royce ' s conception of God tended to coi£e even nearer to
Christian modes of thought later in his philosophy.
Mot only, then, was Royce's position theistic, but he
was also in a great measure of harmony with the Christian
conception of God. His approach was different.
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II. Individuation in Royce.
A. jJhe subordination of the individual to the Absolute.
So fragmentary are the meanings and so partial are
the purposes which are to be found in the life of the indivi-
dual self that an absolute Self furnishes at once the only
possible unity of finite individuals and the only means
of fulfilment of human experience. Beginning with this
concept, Hoyce made it one of his chief concerns in his
later philosophizing "to find in the world of the Absolute
elbow room for the individual. 1,35 In spite of those who
hold to the contrary, *° it is the opinion of the author
that Royce never gave up his monistic conception or the
subordinate place of the individual. Certainly he did
not intend to do so. It has been pointed out in the
discussion of the Absolute that there is good reason to
believe that Hoyce did not identify the Community with
(iod. The Problem of Christianity simply presupposes his
conception of the absolute Self though his idea of the
Absolute has been changed to a conception more like that
of the (rod of Christianity. In many of his ethical
discussions, Royce simply gives his attention to the moral
responsibility of man and does not give any really new
treatment of the Absolute. It may be said that the
individual could not have had such a place in the moral
order if Royce held to his earlier view, and it may be
said that these views would be contradictory. Such,
indeed, aay be the case. But it is the contention of
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the writer that Koyce did not make any radical departure
from his earlier views. And further, the writer has tried
to show in the disvassion of the Absolute that there
is not the contradiction that there seems to be. Koyce'
a
conception of the nature of time must be always borne in
mind: if there is disagreement with his views, the first
point of attack (so far as the relation of the particular
to the Absolute is concerned) must be on the conception
of time.
There was, then, I insist, the subordination
of the individual to the Absolute. To quote from an
57
oft-repeated strain in xioycei
.... In the Absolute all finite lives, wills, meanings
are cor.bciously recognised, iulfilleu and justly
expressed.
1« Bearing on the problem of evil.
It is quite clear that, unless there can be
freedom of choice resident in the individual, there cannot
be moral responsibility. Individuals would be only puppets
in the hands of the Absolute. Now, there is certainly a
seeming contradiction in any view which holds to a Universal
Will or Absolute and tries also to make out a case for
moral autonomy. The case for the self- directing individual
will have to be examined carefully. It is from this
consideration that the status of the individual in Koyce'
s
system is here treated with.
Also, one must bear in mind that natural evils
hark back to the Absolute for their causation unless tb*y
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are located somewhere else. Koyc6 seeks to establish a
relation between natural evil and moral failure though
not apart from other considerations, most notably temporal.
Such a relationship can only be examined through a survey
of his thoughts on individuation.
There is, then, double reason for making a second
point of approach to the problem of evil in Koyce a consider-
ation of his views on the individual.
2. More pronounced at the first: the individual only
relative
•
The attainment of one will, "an Universal Will,"
is the emphasis which Hoyce gives throughout his Keligious
Aspects of Philosophy .
.... The universal will of the moral insight must aim
at the destruction of all which separates us into a
heap of different selves, and at the attainment of
some higher positive organic aim. The "one undivided
soul" we are bound to make our ideal. (30)
One can see that this is a point of emphasis, and that,
according to the proposition just stated, it would hardly
be a departure from it to advance either to a position in
which the free nature of the individual remained almost
not at all, or, in the other direction, to a recognition
of the need of the exertion of the individual's will, for
in this quotation there are roots of moral appeal.
Hoyce 's earliest books stressed the Oneness of the
universe and of will. Its moral urging is reduced to a
minimum; the main ploa is, "Individual, find a high degree
of fulfilment in that one."
((
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3. Difficulties in which this subordination involved him.
To a man with little moral consciousness the
criticism that such a system, or may we not better say,
such a manner of emphasis, left little or no place for
individual moral initiative, might not have brought much
concern. But for Hoyce, the appeal for ideals and loyalty
was an ever-growing one. It rang more resonantly in his
ears as he advanced in years and was an increasing echo in
hiB later works.
Hoyce' s emphases changed so greatly that it is
the estimate of some that his whole position changed quite
radically. The writer contends for little change in the
latter, great in the former. Royce found himself in a
difficult position, philosophically speaking, when he became
more of the moral enthusiast. He did what any man does,
and that is to say, he found, or made, a place in his
philosophy for his new data got from the world of experience.
Was this rationalization? Critically, yes; but no philosophe
has yet risen above it. As to how well he succeeded in
finding a place in his philosophy for mighty deeds of valor
in the world of morals, it is our right to inquire.
a. On account of his deBire for the overcoming of evil.
Hoyce was morally earnest because he saw an
imperfect world order, an order in which much was short of
what it should be. There is idealism in the world, but there
are many who do not lite up to that idealism. Can men do
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anything for the abatement of evil in the world? Royce
felt that they could.
There was certainly evil in the world. What other
purpose could it serve than that which was achieved through
its overcoming? ri!here was good to he found in the meeting
and overcoming of evil. Yes, in the victory over evil was
a cue t# the solution of the problem of evil, especially
so far as ethics were concerned.
b. On account of the small place for such activity in
Royce ' s first treatments of the Absolute.
Royce' s absolute idealism would reduce men to
the plane of complete dependence on the all-inclusive
being of the world, yet Royce, moved by his moral
experience, contends for the ethical selfhood of man. (39)
There was really little place for such moral programs
as Royce later formulated when, as in the earlier works,
Royce is advocating an Universal Will. Some modifications
were necessary. What Royce did was to show that there was
room in his Absolute for individual initiative.
(1) Criticisms which Royce received and their effect on
his philosophy.
The most vulnerable point of Royce* s system was
the point which most naturally drew the fire, friendly though
it was, of the California critics of Royce' s address on the
"Conception of Grod:" viz
. .
the troublesome position toward
which the pantheistic element in his philosophy leads.
Royce realized that he had, as yet, made out no good case for
the individual' 8 effort in the world order, iivil was a
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vexing problem: the moral aspects of it most evidently
pricked his conscience when it was shown him that men could
he expected to act very little under the stimulation of a
system in which little account had been taken of the need
of human effort.
Royce was convinced of the soundness of his
idealistic position and hardly less of the worth of his
description of the Absolute. He thought that his conception
of the Absolute needed to be supplemented, but not changed.
It was quite natural that, in presenting different
aspects of his system, he should view the Absolute in a
different perspective. An "Absolute Thought" became a
"World Self." And I am persuaded that, if Royce had been
asked if he made a complete identity of the latter with
the former, he would have said that, of course, he did.
Naturally, when selfhood was the topic of discussion, it
was entirely pertinent to view the Absolute as the "World
Self." If it be objected that Royce did not leave room for
such a view as this in his earlier conceptions of the Absolute,
then I answer that that is what he is trying to show in his
later writings. He is trying to show that his Absolute is
"Self," "Will,"— and further that it is the God of Christian
40theology, in the main. Maintain, if one must, that Royce
is not entirely consistent in his later views; but I should
hesitate a long time before I should say that it is another
Absolute
.
In short, then, Royce tried to show that there
•0k
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was a place in his system for individual initiative. Ihe
difficulties in the way of this Royce sought to resolve as
best he could. In a measure, at least, he succeeded in
making his position clear.
(2) Growing moral consciousness of Royce.
Though Royce was a great enthuiast for his
absolutism, there seems to be good reason for agreeing
with Bakewell in saying that
He was never the partisan of his convictions....
Never was an absolutist less concerned with having
followers. (41)
If a thorough-going championship of his absolutism got in
the way of the urge which he felt to plead for his moral
convictions, then his absolutism simply had to fit itself
into those convictions. Logician that he was, he concerned
himself with relating his moral convictions to his system
as best he could, it is the opinion of the present writer
that he succeeded fairly well, especially when one considers
the difficulties into which every philosophical system
apparently falls at one point or another.
Perhaps greater age, perhaps richer contacts with
life and the realization that there is a real struggle
in the world gave to Royce his ethical enthusiasm. At
any rate, one finds Royce leaving all of the airy heights
of philosophy to come down to the needs and struggles of the
finite individual. The problem of evil must be met not
only in the metaphysical realm, but in the form of moral
II
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evil. The philosopher gives a challenge. Witness especially,
The Philosophy of Loyalty .
B. The more important place which Royce gives to the
individual in his later thought.
God cannot be One except by being many....
•••• Unless the finite is real, the Absolute itself
has no reality. (42)
These quotations given from The World and the Individual
indicate that Royce had provided a place for the individual
in his system. The self is a real unit even though Royce
does not make it entirely independent of the Absolute.
If fact the very nature of the Absolute is revealed in
the self.
I believe it to be demonstrable that the real
universe is an exactly determinate but actually
infinite system, whose structure is that revealed
to us in Self- consciousness. (43)
Such quotations as these reveal not only the dignity and
reality of the self in Royce ' s conception but also the
fact that the self is given greater consideration in the
later writings of Royce. It ought to be said also that
Royce considered the dignity of the self enhanced by the
fact that the self finds its complete realization in the
Infinite,— in the One. The self is integral in the life
of the Absolute.
1. The self and the Beloved Community.
When, in The Problem of Christianity
,
Royce sets
forth his idea of the Beloved Community, the individual
has come to a very high degree of realization.
((
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The Community is only possible as a Community of selves.
All of its ideals have to be realized through selves.
The appeal for loyalty is made to the individual person.
Royce had seen that his earliest works did not stir the
hearts of men to the great tasks which were before them
in the moral realm. How, his reader asked, could an indi-
vidual have any hand at all in the great affair of the
universe which Royce had described? Royce sought to present
as his reply the idea that this is a great world drama
in which each man has his part. He can perform it well
or poorly. Royce realized that there was need for
another note to be sounded besides the well-ordered
reasoning of his strictly metaphysical works .^4
2. The Absolute suffers very little from this effort
to give the individual a more important place
•
In sounding the ethical note of his later writings
Royce did not present a new conception of the Absolute. He
rather left the Absolute as it was. But he acquired a
deeper inBight into some of the Christian doctrines as he
advanced in years and so his writings took on more of the
form of the teachings of Christianity. He came to the
conclusion that philosophical reasoning arrived not only at
the Christian God, bat at some of the other great doctrines
of the church. He came to the conclusion that, if there
were no doctrine of the atonement, a similar doctrine would
have to be invented to account for the principle of atone-
ment which is found in the universe. He approached the
<
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problem of Bin and atonement from the standpoint of
philosophy and arrived at conclusions not much different
from those of Christian theology. All of this meant
greater concern for vital human problems than in his first
metaphysical writings and so it meant fuller treatment of
the individual. Royce found a place for the individual
in his monistic system rather than accommodating his
system to his new emphasis on the individual. At least,
this is the contention of the writer; and this is, it would
certainly seem, what Royce meant to do.
3. The new emphases in Royce's later thought.
By way of suranariaing, then, the later writings
of Royce are oft en thought to be changes of his system, but
are, it is held by the writer, only new emphases on the place
which can be found in his system for Christian thought and
principles, and so for the importance and worth of individuals
and human effort. This turn in his thinking was brought
about by a new emphasis on ethical principles and the need of
moral exertion and loyalty to ideals, and was based ultimately
on the fact that it was indicated to him that his system was
seriously lacking in this element, or rather point of appeal,
and so, to that extent was inadequate. Royce was not, at
the first, aware of the fact that others would not be inspired
by the same ideals as he, but rather thought that there would
be no difficulty in inferring ethical principles from his
system. Then, too, his ethical sensitiveness developed with
the years of his life.
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III. Royce and the problem of Evil.
A study of the Absolute of Royce has served to
give somewhat of an indication of the lines which Royce
would have to follow in developing his problem of evil
and has indicated something of the alternatives of which
he would be able to avail himself while maintaining logical
consistency. The problem of individuation was fceen to be
a very difficult one for him, and the turn which his
philosophy took in this connection was noted. Let these
facts be borne in mind as his treatment of the problem of
evil is taken up.
A. The place of evil in the philosophy of Royce.
1. "The core of his whole system."
George Santayana says that for Royce the problem
of evil was "the core of his whole system."45 At any rate,
it is the place at which his absolutism is put to a severe
test. How a good God can tolerate evil unless He is forced
to has been one of the most basic problems of philosophy.
Royce does not profess any large measure of originality
in hi 8 solution of the problem though he does feel that
the discussion of the existence of error which preceeds
in his Religious Aspects of Philosophy possesses originality.'
Royce does feel, however, that he provides adequate salvation
for his Absolute by his solution of the problem. It must
be said that, at least in the matter of analogies used
and the organization of the problem, Royce shows originality.
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Inasmuch as it is of the utmost importance to
reconcile the existence of evil with an Absolute in philosophy
if the Absolute is to be on stable ground, this is certainly
a very important problem in Royce* s philosophy. She ethical
turn which Royce 1 s consideration of evil takes is also one
of the emphatic points of his whole philosophy.
a. Use in proving the existence of God.
Koyce made use of the existence of error in the
world to prove the existence of his Absolute. According to
his idealism nothing can exist except for a mind that knows
it. In our own minds we find the existence of error, and
never the whole of truth. The very existence of error, which
very few will attempt to deny, proves that there must be a
truth from which it differs. Since truth exists in a mind,
the only mind that can know with completeness the truth
must be an omniscient mind to arrive at which is to arrive
at the Absolute. Royce treats with this problem of error
in his Religious Aspects of Philosophy . 47 He states that
he considers the chapter devoted to "The Possibility of
Error" as "one of those parts of the argument the author
supposes to contain most relative originality. "^ Whether
or not this argument is valid, and it appears to be so
if one accepts the episteraological idealism, it is at
least important as showing the attitude which Royce took
toward evil. His consideration of evil is quite analogous
to this argument for God. 'jJhe existence of evil seems to
I
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Royce to point to a whole without evil. As truth finds
its wholeness in God, so also does goodness.
b. Influenced his views of the individual.
If God was the perfect and good triumphant, the
individual was a child of finitude • In the individual
evil existed. In removing the blame for evil from God,
unless he wished to say that evil was an illusion, Royce
had to place it on man. In spite of all the difficulties
which his absolutism placed in the way of such a view, Koyce
with his keen ethical insight, held man's finite will
accountable for evil. To this extent Royce' s insistence
on the reality of evil markedly affected his ideas of the
individual.
2# His earnestness in insisting on the reality of evil.
a. Especially in the light of his monistic philosophy.
In line with his monistic philosophy Royce had
the alternative of regarding evil as an illusion. He was
persuaded that evil was real. Kven the very limitations
under which one who thinks labors are an evil. We cannot
pass by the problem of evil by simply saying that it is
seeming. Royce goes even farther than this in saying that
good is to a large extent made possible by evil. The
good grows out of the resist en ce to the evil. The
existence of evil was given an important metaphysical
position in Royce 1 b system.
(
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b. His almost religious concern for the existence of
evil.
Perhaps one of the reasons why Royce so emphasized
the existence of evil was that it was almost a matter of
religion with him. Santayana says that Royce was not
logical on this point, bat that his argument was the result
of a religious experience.
(1) Royce' s religious heritage.
Royce says of himself that he was "a born
non- conformist. 1,49 Nevertheless, he professes a religious
interest at an early age. Santayana, whose description
of the basis of Royce* s consideration of evil we have been
following says that Royce was heir to a Calvinistic tradition.
This does not seem to me to be the real source of Royce's
position. He was carefully instructed by his mother and
sisters in the Bible, and, no doubt, in a good deal of the
Calvinistic theology. Perhapi he rejected the Biblical
items in favor of the theological. The notes of his
autobiographical sketch^ would rather seem to indicate
that he rebelled against both and did a bit of independent
thinking even at an early age, undeveloped as it may have
been. He no doubt arrived at a conception of an absolute
God in the country, where one is not unlikely to think
of God in something of the terms of the nineteenth psalm
and see a oneness in nature. The devout person will then
seek to release God from the guilt of evil's existence.
I(5
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(2) Effort to exonerate Providence.
Royce does seem to have been a devout man in
spite of his enjoyment of non-conformity. At any rate
he felt that it was an important task of his philosophy
to exonerate God from the blame for evil. He accordingly
simply gave his conception of God farther security by
infinitude, and connected evil with finitu.de. God must
remain blameless: this was religion to Royce.
c. His emphasis on the need of moral exertion.
Not only must God be good, but evil must not
be passed by by man as something which he cannot help
and so not trouble himself with trying to overcome.
Though man, as everything finite, had evil present in
himself, it was morally obligatory upon every man to exert
himself to the maximum of his ability for the overcoming
of evil. It was imperative for every man to overcome that
evil just as much as he could. Not only was a man responsi-
ble for his own sin, he had a responsibility to his fellow
man: he ought to help to atone for the sin of the whole
race •
The importance of the part of Royce' s philosophy
which dealt with evil to his whole system is apparent.
The stress which he placed upon the various aspects of
evil and the considerations connected with it lead to a
realization of the place it played in his thinking. It
is, then, quite important for an understanding of the
philosophy of Royce to understand his treatment of evil.
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B. Moral Evil.
As one approaches the question of moral evil in
Royce he wonders just bow much of a place Royps will give
to it. As his absolutism was considered it seemed as though
Royce would argue for the illusory character of evil because
of the all-inclusive character of the Absolute. We find,
on the contrary, that evil is given a place and a very
real place, but that the moral integrity of the Absolute
is not touched by evil's existence because of the difference
which time and eternity make in the situation. In the case
of man natural evils are not the result of his free-will.
Is man, then, to be relieved of moral responsibility?
Royce answers very earnestly to the contrary. Man is not
the irresponsible victim of a world order. Man sins.
He sins sins that must be atoned for.
1, Its meaning and purpose.
Kvil is a necessary thing in Royce 1 s conception
of the Absolute. It conditions a good whole and without
it there would not be any character to the whole. Goodness
in the life of the individual results from a realization
of the evil nature of an evil impulse and the acceptance
of a higher inBight.51 It is only through the existence
of evil and the evil will that there is an opportunity
for the manifestation of the good will.
In God there is a knowledge of the evil will
and yet an overcoming of the evil impulses of men in such
a way that they form a total good will.
(I
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Therefore is God's life perfect, because it includes
not only the knowledge of thy finite wicked will, but
the insight into its truth as a moment in the real
universal will. (58)
•••• This very presence of ill in the temporal order
is the condition of the perfection of the eternal
order. (53)
The whole world process is a struggle toward a
goal, livery life has this same struggle. The realization
of the goal is only possible through the struggle. Life
without this struggle would have no goal, no ideal, and
hence, no real goodness. Finite and Absolute are alike
in this respect: there is not the perfection without the
striving. The striving and the suffering of the world are
a real part of the Absolute. Although there is thi» temporal
aspect of the Absolute such that fulfilment of purpose is
never realized at any temporal moment, there is also the
aspect of reality by which all is viewed as one life-process
in completion: through the former the Absolute is able to
realize the latter.
a. Possibility of its use in character perfection.
In God and man, "Evil is a good thing— to
overcome. Goodness is not founded upon innocence.
Goodness comes from feeling the impulse to evil and struggling
against it either to the overcoming of it through resistence
or through atonement. The evil impulse is an element in
the good man's goodness.
Kvil is therefore a real element in character
perfection: it makes possible all of the great worths of
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life. The good 18 the evil overcome; a good life is one
in which evil has been met, strived with, even to the point
of suffering, and subordinated. Here is a real vision of
the goodness of the totality of things,-.- of the nature
of the good of the Absolute. It is our task to strive
not only for the victory in our own lives but that there
may be "the progressive realization.... of the eternal
life of an Infinite Spirit."**5 Genuine goodness is evil
triumphed over.
b. Inherent in man's finitude.
.civil is inherent in any finite order and so evil
finds its expression through the finite moral agent, The
Absolute is not finite but infinite, and evil has no place
in the infinite or the eternal order. On the contrary,
The hatred and condemnation of just your life and
character makes God holy. (56)
It is through finite moral beings that every moral evil
finds its expression. Kven more,-- but for a given indivi-
dual a particular moral evil with its consequent ill could not
have been. 57
2. Man is not relieved from moral responsibility in the
le ast •
Since moral wrong is brought about by an act of
will on the part of the finite individual, that individual
is to blame for that evil with all of its ill. Nevertheless,
there is a question as to whether the individual ought to be
held responsible for evil if it is necessary and serves a
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purpose which, in the end, is good, Koyce sees this
CO
difficulty. ° ^nd bo he points out again the distinction
which he has made between the finite and temporal, and
the eternal. Moral acts occur in time. By his deed the
moral agent is free to make his own world better or worse.
He cannot make the Whole evil because his evil deed will
be atoned for by himself, at some later time, or by someone
else. This much is foreknowledge to the Absolute: in the
whole of things the Absolute Will will be fulfilled, and
the Absolute Will is entirely good. But foreknowledge
in time is only possible to the Absolute "of the general,
and of the causally determined, and not of the unique and
free."*'9 Neither God nor man can foreknow, at any temporal
moment, what a free-will agent will do. God's knowledge
is "eternal knowledge" rather than foreknowledge. Moral
evil is accordingly never without its ill: the only way
that perfection of the whole is brought about is through
supplementing the evil by the good will of another or of
himself.
An individual's freedom basically lies in the
fact that he iB free to choose whether he shall attend
to the good which he knows at the time of choice or shall
narrow his attention and ignore this good. He is "free
to attend to or not attend to the Ought" as he has come
to know it at the time of choice. The world-order will
overcome this evil of the individual not because he was
not able to do any ill at all, but because there are other
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wills to atone for it, and the good will in the world-
order is stronger than the evil will.
In sum, one may say of any particular moral evil
that
This evil is due to the evil-doer and without his
choice it need not have occurred at all. (60)
a. The sinfulness of moral evil.
Royce, in an article entitled "The Second Death,
"
61
discusses the doctrine of sin. He makes a very clear
identification of what he had earlier discussed as moral
evil with the Christian doctrine of sin though he avoids
the theological forms of treatment. Sin, he maintains, is
departure from our moral ideal. There must be knowledge
of what iB right and the conscious departure from it, hut
granted this, and the departure is sin,— or "treason."
When a man sins he affects the whole community of individuals
of which he is a part.
The problem of reconciliation then, — if reconciliation
there is to be,-- concerns not only the traitor, but
the wounded or shattered community. (62)
Otherwise expressed, sin is betraying "our own
chosen cause."62 It is "consciously to chose to forget
,
through a narrowing of the field of attention an Ought
that one already recognizes."63 Thus sin is choosing a
worse when we know a better. It is the worst form of short-
coming. It is voluntary inattention to the highest, a
disregard for all of the worth of the Ought and all of the
good which might flow from it if it were not disregarded.
t<
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(1) The principle of loyalty and loyalty to loyalty.
The freeom of choice which Royce gave to the
individual has been remarked upon. Royce re-emphasizes
the need for that choice in the case of ethical conduct.
There is only one way to be ethical. That is to
choose your cause, and then serve it.... (64)
Herein true individuality finds itself. It is only thus
that we find our highest measure of freedom. Royce makes
the plea that we exercise our autonomy at this point.
In fact, it might be said that in this sort of ethical
freedom,— this selection of that to which one is to be
loyal,— the individual really finds himself. Each
individual is a canter of a particular "realm of duty."
It is our duty to center our lives around purposes,— and
if our purposes are sincere, the centering of our lives
about purposes means the centering of our moral universe
about certain loyalties. In fact, every rational individual
will inevitably seek "his own form of loyalty, his own
cause, and his opportunity to serve that cause .... "6 ^
It is only thus that one can find spiritual rest and peace.
The individual chooses his causes and then passes
judgment upon himself as to whether he has servert those
chosen causes. The individual, stimulated by society,
is his own severest critic of his life in the light of
those causes. The conscience is the self's Judge. The
single deed is set up againBt the ideal, and "we judge
ourselves, condemn ourselves, or approve ourselves."66
IV
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In Royce's philosophy of Loyalty he offers a
most delightful treatment of his theme of loyalty as the
great moral force of the universe. He indicates the
training which is needful for loyalty, pointing out the
social aspects of loyalty and the need of strong deeds on
the part of strong men,— morally speaking.
.... Our loyalty is trained and kept alive by the
influence of personal leaders.
.... Loyalty is perfected through great strains, labors
and sacrifices in the service of the cause. (67)
Loyalty has a place in the religious life. Loyalty here
is the effort of the individual to express the belief in
an external and conscious unity of life through the
practical living of the individual. 60
Loyalty to loyalty is for Royce the supreme good,
the final command of the moral law# A cause is good for me
and so may demand my loyalty "in so far as it is essentially
loyalty to loyalty, that is an aid and a furtherance of
loyalty in my fellows." It falls short, and is an evil
cause, to the extent to which it is destructive of loyalty
69in the world of my fellows. Anyone showing loyalty to
his cause, regardless of whether his cause be my cause, sets
me the example of loyalty. Loyalty has a certain contagion.
It is the duty of every man, then, to find his own personal
cause and serve it with all his might for the inspiration
of others and so that there may be "a maximum increase of
loyalty" among his fellow-men. "Loyalty to universal loyalty
is indeed the fulfilment of the whole law." 70
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(8) Treason*
When one betrays the cause of his own choosing,
he is to that extent a traitor, The traitor mast have
the knowledge of the ideal and mast then, "by some one
voluntary act of his life have been deliberately false
71to his cause." A Once an act of treason has been committed,
it can never be undone. This is the tragic part of it, and
this is what causes the remorse of the traitor. It is the
case of the "hell of the irrevocable." We are not merely
traitors to society and to the principle of loyalty in the
universe, but we are traitors to our own chosen causes.
Such a failure makes one "estranged, so far as that one
unpardonable fault estranged one, from one's own chosen
moral hearth and fireside." 72 In this manner Royce
describes his conception of what sin is. So irrevocable
is it in character that, even tho ugh something may happen
in the moral world of the sinner which would add some new
aspect to the deed making it not quite so heinous, the
sinner could never forgive himself because the deed was a
betrayal of his loyalties and to that extent can never be
change d
.
(3) The need of reconciliation and a new life work.
What then can be done about acts of treachery?
Must they ever mar the moral beauty of the world? Can the
sinner himself do nothing; society nothing? Royce answers
that there is work for both to do.
I
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The reconciliation must necessarily concern
not only the traitor hut a wounded and shattered community.
But what is indeed irrevocahly lost to thee community
through the traitor's deed is precisely what I just
called "unscarred love." (73)
How is the traitor then to face society and have
any spirit for further effort? There is just this to be
said. The community had no assurance at the outset that
the individual who had not to that time been traitor,
would remain as he was. Consequently, he can he taken
back by society into almost his former status, for society
can never be certain as to just how great an extent any
man is going to remain true to itself.
There is, then, first of all, the opportunity
which the traitor himself has to do something toward the
reconciliation and toward the triumph over his own treason.
The individual may begin anew. He may exert himself in a
direction opposite to that in which he was acting at the
time of his treachery. He may effect a new life work.
This, then, is the individual's great opportunity: a new
life work. The sinner, by supplementing the life of
treachery with an active life of loyalty to ideals may do
much to overcome his own act of treason, if not overcoming
it completely, and may enlist in the wor& of atoning for the
whole sum of treason which is in the world, or for some
particular treason. In other words, he may live a
declaration to his loyalties.
<
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b. The social effects of moral evil.
It its indeed true that "no man liveth to himfc6lf."
This is especially true in the moral realm, juver; nemljer
of Bocift; is ir danger of being robbed of the most choice
possessions of the spirit, gained by his loyalty, by some
other member of society whom he has trusted as a brother.
The tragedy of broken faith is the worst of human tragedies. 74
Once an act of treachery has been committed, society
is not the same as it was before. Love has been betrayed,
and faith broken, and an irrevocable sin committed against
the forces of loyalty.
(1) The principle of atonement carries over into society.
Because of the effect of his action on society,
it is very hard for the traitor himself to effect the atone-
ment for his deed. But there is a way in which it may be
effected. It is not through mere forgiveness of the traitor
by the community. As fine as this may be and however much
one who has been traitor may seek to make that forgiveness
merited, there is yet in any love which the community may
shower upon him the tragedy of the treason as part and
parcel of the new love.
Since it is the traitor who did the sinful deed,
and not the community as such, atonement can be had in some
creative deed of society itself. In the new deeds to be
done society can make amends for the ill-directed energy
of the traitor. The community relies for the character of
these new deeds on other individuals.

47
. ... Tliis triumph over treason can only be accomplished
"by the community, or on behalf of the community, through
some steadfastly loyal servant who acts, so to speak,
as the incarnation of the very spirit of the community. (75)
The very noblest characters in society face daily the problem
of atonement. These loyal souls effect the triumph over
treason.
Bat the treason is specific. And so the way of
meeting it must be specific. Whatever work the loyal man
does is of a creative nature, but his creative work is that
for which the treason has furnished the opportunity, it
isn't treason in general,but just the individual treason
which furnishes the opportunity for a deed or deeds of a
creative nature which can overcome the treason. The specific
treason, then, gives the occasion and supplies the condition
of the creative deed which counteracts its effect. Not only
does the treason virtually make possible the creative deed,
but
The world, as transformed by this creative deed , is
better than it wo aid have be en had all else remained
the same , but had that deed of treason not be6n done .
That is, the new creative deed has mad e the new world
better than it was wefore the blow of treason fell. (76)
(2) The result is a whole which may rightly be regarded
as go od •
It is quite clear, then, that Royce sees the good
triumphant and dominant. Treason there is and will be. But
society has individuals strong enough to meet the exigences
of any treason. Incarnating itself in those individuals,
society is able to atone for the treachery. The atonement
having been perfected, the world is better than it was at
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first. Indeed, this very treason has brought about deeds
which give strong moral character to the world through the
counteracting powers for good.
It is not always easy to see this atonement in
action in our world. Sometimes the deed of the traitor is
such a breaking of faith that it would seem that no amount
of atoning could make amends for it. Actually, we cannot
prove the complete efficacy of atoning influences. It is
nevertheless, "the postulate of the highest form of human
spirituality." Though it cannot be proved by a study of
mankind, it can be asserted by the creative will of the
loyal. And,
No baseness or cruelty of treason so deep or s_o tragic
shall enter our human world
,
but thUt loyaI~loye shall
be able in due time to oppose to just that deed of
treason Tts fitting 5*eed of "atonement . ( 77
)
So, in the moral realm we find that a part may be evil, but
the whole is good: the good whole is made possible through
the evil parts subordinated to the good parts.
(a) Christ's work considered.
The Christian doctrine of atonement is an approach
to the problem of the atonement from the same point of view.
Treason did its work when man fell, according to the Christian
legend. The work of Christ seized upon just this opportunity
as a means for a creative work which would make the world
better than it could have been had man not fallen. Christ's
work was more than a moral influence: it was a moral deed,
moral effort expended to the end of overcoming treachery.
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Christian feeling, art and worship have all given the feeling
that through the work of Christ the world was really left
nobler and richer and better. This is a representation
as true as it is beautiful. Society incarnates itself in
individuals for the expression of its creative and reconciling
will. "Atonement is expressed. .. • by a peculiarly noble
and practically efficacious type of human deeds.
"
7e The
Christian idea of the atonement is a symbolic expression
of the same thing. That the deed of atonement means triumph
and a better, richer world is "the postulate of the highest
form of Christian spirituality.... The Christian symbol
and the practical postulate are two sides of the same life,
—
at once human and divine." 79
(b) The result of the whole, — the treason and the creative
deed,-- is that the world is better off in the end.
Evils of the traitor pierce to the very heart of the
community, but out of this very condition arise "suffering
servants" and "loyal human lovers" who, in the name and for
the sake of society, advance the standards of morality and
are such a force for moral good that the moral worth arising
from their noble deeds is greater than could have ever been
attained but for the evil which prompted them.
c. The need of earnestness.
Royce's appeal to moral earnestness rests on the
grounds that our causes are self-chosen. We do not serve
any external law. Indeed, one may be inspired to loyalty
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by some other person, not because the other person's loyalties
are the same as his own, bat because of the very earnestness
of that person in his own cause,— a cause which, though
not your own, is not in conflict with your own.
(1) An exertion of the will.
We choose the cause we will serve, and we then
choose whether, in some particular act, we are L'oing to be
true to that cause or turn traitor. Select the best you
know, urges Hoyce, and then, serve it with your best.
Act intelligently. The community cannot rely merely on
those who are well-meaning and loving, but needs
calmly considerate and enlightened people, who distinguish
clearly between fervor and wisdom, who know what depths
of woe and wrong have been sounded, but who also know
that only self-controlled thoughtfulness and well-
disciplined self-restraint can devise the best means
of help.... We desire those who know. (80)
We see, then, that Hoyce urges both loyalty and rational
living
.
i'here would seem to be some inconsistencies in
Koyce's appeal at this point. Loyalty to loyalty and reasoned
service to the community may be considered as paradoxical
in character. Critics may also ask how he could ^ive freedom
of action in a world in which everything is going to turn
out all right in the end. We must content ourselves at this
point to observe these varied elements in Koyce's view.
*t least, there are many things to show that such paradoxes
do certainly appear in life.
As a matter of fact, Hoyce nowhere emphasized

the will of the individual as such. He declared an eternal
overruling of all evil. He urged for moral earnestness
and says that we are free to make choices and he argues in
one place that God does not foreknow individual deeds as
such,^ hut "will" is mainly reserved for use in connection
with the Absolute and the general moral force in the world.
j)'or instance, he speaks of "such a deed," i^. e_. an act of
loyalty, as "the expression of the creative and reconciling
will."**2 It seems to me, however, that, in all fairness to
Koyce, it should "be said that a comparison of his writings
in connection with moral 6ffort and his view of the individual,
reveals an appeal for the existence of the will (and, as we
have said, the need of exerting it) which is just as strong
as that of many who constantly use the word in connection
with their discussions of morality.
(2) The resultant goodness.
Evil is than, "a good thing to overcome." The
world is better for the good which the evil has made possible.
The good in the moral realm is not always visible to us who
can see such a small bit of the whole order of things, but
it is real. It is part of the goodness of a wholeness
which gains its character from all of the suffering, all of
the moral effort of the loyal and of God himself who suffers
and strives with men for the attainment of the good which is
in the eternal order. The eternal order is all good. It
is given character by the finite striving and failings end
evils of men,— and through this union with his own, in God.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
LIBRARY

52.
G. The Idea of Universal Harmony.
If Royce treated with the problem of evil aB a
very serious one and one not to be lightly passed by, he
nevertheless felt that his system made adequate provision
for it. He did not deny evil: it was something which man
should attack and fight against with all zeal. It is
something to be reckoned with, something real. In the
Whole, however, evil had no abiding character. It was
as the discords in a symphony which contribute to the
wondrous worth of the whole composition. Without the
discordant notes there could not be the grand effect of
the whole symphony. A note in itself might be a discord,
harsh and unpleasant, and unacceptable if struck alone.
But, when it was a part of one purposeful composition,
its place was to make possible the larger greater whole.
The listener does not take the note which is discordant
and single it out as that to which he will turn his whole
attention. He relates it to the whole selection; he holds
his Judgment and feelings in abeyance until the whole phrase
has been completed, and, at the end of the composition, the
listener reviews the whole as a beautiful pieceof music.
This was for Royce the most satisfying analogy
which he could find for evil. It is fundamental as an
analogy on which his conception of the place of evil is
based. Kvil is only a part of a great world harmony. As
finite beingt we can only hear the single notes, so to
speak; we can only see definite points in the time order,
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but cannot review the whole process. The Absolute, on the
other hand, is as the listener to the symphony. The Absolut
can see and foresee the whole symphony of the world order,
or better, he can see it apart from time: the Absolute is
not bound down by time limitations as are men.
The world is a harmony, a beautiful harmony, in
which there is not the blot of evil, only the Absolute
can see it as suchbe cause only the Absolute can see more
than temporal moments of it. We can get a glimpse of the
way in which there is a harmonizing when we consider moral
evil and the way in which it is atoned for, but we can only
see a very short distance in relation to natural ills, and
so it is practically impossible for us to see the universal
harmony of the whole except through a realization of what
the nature of the Absolute is and by an implicit trust in
the purposiveness of which we find a suggestion when we
contemplate the world processes about us.
2. Partial evil: universal good.
Royce is not at all satisfied with the idea that
rt,Evil results from the free-will of moral agents, who have
to suffer for their own chosen sins.'"83 He feels that this
places far too much power in the hands of thOBe who would
not know how to use it. The murderer and the seducer and
the conqueror would be able to bring evil upon the innocent
by the very power which devolved upon them. The Absolute
would have its moral integrity questioned for placing such
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power in the hands of the irresponsible
•
The only other monistic solution which Koyce
thinks helps in the solution of the problem is that partial
evil is universal good. However, there have been widely
varying treatments of this proposed solution and many of
these attempts fall far short of giving a satisfactory
answer.®
4*
a. Erroneous views.
The old view that evil is simply an illusion
is not acceptable to Royce. This view, he says, is
analogous to the different impressions which one would
get in looking at a statue through a microscope and looking
at it as a whole. In the former case one would find nothing
but a rough stony surface; in the latter a beautiful piece
of art. But a spot on an apple does not make a good whole
nor does a slight disorder in one of the organs of the
body mean a body sound in health. We do not have simply
to deal with a lack of harmony but with horrible discord
in the world. One simply has to consider the agonies of the
wounded on the battle-field to realize that this is true.
This does not make it seem that the whole of the world is
good, evil only an illusion. The real issue is the quality
of the evil and not the quantity. Any evil,— "a single
practical failure,.... an hour of darkness and private
85despair, a public calamity, or even a sleepless night,"
—
is a real and positive evil, and, as such, seems to be in
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conflict with the principle of reason in the universe.
The view that evil is simply an illusory something is,
than, unsatisfactory.
Kqually unsatisfactory is the idea that evil is
a means to good. Apart from the fact that there is much
evil in the world which is, most apparently, a means to
no good end, this view leads one into the dileramatic
position of having an absolute Reason which either could
not or would not use a good means for the attainment of
the good end. In the event of the first alternative,
there is more than one Reason in the world, and the force
of opposition may even be stronger than the Reason itself.
In the event of the second alternative, the one Reason
evidently chose evil for its own sake in preference to a
better way.
An even worse attempt at explanation is to say
that evil is necessary by way of contrast. The same problem
of whether the one Reason couldn't or wouldn't depend on
some better way of making good more attractive arises in
connection with this view.
If.... the One Reason could not do better, but had
to use the contrast, then the One was less powerful
in its devices than is the maker of a concert- programme,
who has no need to introduce into his concert any saw-
filing or tin- trumpeting or pot-scraping to set off
the beauty of his songs or symphonies. (87)
This quotation is here introduced not only because
of its revelancy to this point, but because of its resemblance
to the analogy of the symphony which Royce uses elsewhere.
(
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There night seen at first thought to he a contradiction
here, bat the distinction which Hoyce draws is the rather
fine distinction which he draws in his whole treatment of
th6 problem of evil, namely that of temporality, The fine
discords within the symphony are taken with the symphony
after the whole phrase of part has been played. The
discordant sounds spoken of here would be synchronous
with the symphony itself, or at least would be no part of
it.
b. The absolute goodness of the Whole.
Koyce ' s view of the problem recognizes the reality
of evil but also insists on the unquestionable goodness of
the Whole, or the Absolute. The Infinite is not tainted
by any of the evil of the finite. If Hoyce were asked if
his Infinite is perfect, he would most likely have made
instant reply in the affirmative. To be sore, the Infinite
was in touch with the evil of man and even suffered with
man, bat the goodness of the Whole is not affected by the
evils of man and the world. The One does not possess
innocent goodness, bat goodness which includes life,
and so all goodness and evil.
To say that God is nevertheless perfectly good is to
say, not that God is innocent, knowing no evil what-
soever and including none; but that he.... includes
the evil will in the structure of his good will....
God is only good because he does so. (88)
(1) Necessary if the world is the work of an Infinite Reason.
Royce finds fault with all of those views of evil

which do not make the world the work of '•the One Reason."
He is equally unsatisfied with any theory which calls in
question the goodness of God. If the world is the work of
an Infinite Reason, Royoe thinks that that Reason must toe
made ethically irreproachable, Again, if evil is not
completely subordinate and without any real power, then
it would seem that the One was not omnipotent and hence
not, in reality, the One.
A minor power for good is not enough. It will not
suffice to find that one hit of reality fights for
our moral needs while anc/ther hit of reality fights
against them, unless we can in some way harmonize
these conflicting aspects, or unless we can show that
they that to6 with us are not only more important or
significant than they that toe against us, tout are
really the deepest truth of things.... (89)
(2) Character of the Whole not like the part.
In the world are to toe found some good and some
toad. These are parts of an All, of an Infinite. But yet,
the Infinite so rises atoove the parts that it possesses
none of the evil. The point at which the Infinite rises
is that of time. Just this element of the Infinite,
however, is its release from finitude and its superceding
of the wrongs of the finite.
(3) Not the insistence that evil is an illusion.
Because the Infinite is stole to rise atoove the
evil of the world in a perfection, we are not then justified
in thinking that evil is not something which really exists.
It is not illusory. It is something to be reckoned with,
contended against, and atoned for. It is most important
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for us to realize this since it is the great reason for
ethical energy.
2. Transcendent nature of the good of the Absolute.
bo much has been indicated about the way in which
the good which is in the Absolute transcends the finite,
and has none of the blemish of the evil which is in the
natural and moral order, that it seems necessary to point
out in more detail the point or points at which the Absolute
makes its departure from finite limits, and, first of all,
the tie that yet binds the Infinite with the finite.
a. The way in which the absolute Self shares in human
suffering.
".... Nothing that is known to the finite is lost
in the Absolute," Koyce holds. 91 All of the striving, the
waiting, love and struggle and suffering are known to the
Infinite; "longing exists in the Absolute life, and as a
significant part thereof."92 Our sorrows are identi-
cally Sod's own sorrows."93
It is clear from these words of Royce that the
Absolute is not apart from human suffering. God has not
just laid out the moral order and withdrawn himself at a
safe distance, there to watch man in his contest with the
elements and with his own self, but God "is touched with
a feeling of our infirmity," knows human wants and
longings.
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(1) This is an assurance that suffering and evil are
neither final nor ultimate.
The fact that God is with us in our struggle
and that we know that there is a force for righteousness
in the world which is greater than our own gives to us
added assurance that our struggle is not in vain. The
striving is associated witfc our finitude
.
Our experience of time is thus for us essentially an
experience of longing, of pursuit, of restlessness. (94)
We know that our strife with evil is worth while.
The evil in the world only serves to enrich its nature as
95
the shadows enrich the light in a picture. It is "in
the conquest over suffering" that "all the nobler gifts of
the Spirit, all the richer experiences of life consist." 96
(8) It is an indication of the way in which the parts
enter into the whole.
We see that in the whole of life comes the victory,
even as in the whole of time comes the perfection of the
world-order. It brings out with added clearness how the
imperfections of certain of the parts are nevertheless
a part, and an essential part, of a perfect whole.
b. The way in which eternity affects the situation.
If there is any one point on which the whole of
the consideration of the problem of evil by Hoyce turns
it would be this very point: the way in which time changes
the situation. It has been shown that Royce objected to
the ordinary solutions of the problem from the absolutist
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standpoint. If the Absolute is fettered by time, then
it is either not able to check evil or not good. The only
way Royce sees of really providing for "the eternal triumph
of good over evil" is for the Absolute to be in a different
time order from the finite, the individual. We learn from
Royce that
Morally evil deeds, and the ill fortune of mankind,
are.... inseparably linked aspects of the temporal
order. (97)
There is a totum simul by which the Absolute
views the world.
.... This same temporal world is, when regarded in its
wholeness, an Sternal order. And I mean by this assertion
nothing whatever but that the whole real content of this
temporal order, whether it is viewed from any one temporal
instant as past or as present or as futureV is at once
known, i. e_. is consciously experienced as a whole, by
the Absolute. (98)
The Eternal order is the temporal order taken in its wholeness,
but yet there is a qualitative difference between the two.
Much that is to be found in the temporal order is overcome
in the Eternal order. No one temporal moment, no mind in
the temporal, can comprehend the Eternal.
By bringing to bear the fact of Eternity and the
Eternal perspective of the Absolute, the appearance of evil
in the temporal order can be understood. In fact, Royce
concluded his chapter on "The Temporal and the Eternal"
in The World and the Individual (volume two) with this
remark
•
For all the questions as to our deeper relations to
the universe are bound up with this problem of Time
and Eternity. (99)

(1) Our view of evil is not the divine view,
Finite beings experience longing without seeing
the final fulfilment of longing. Again, they are not the
fulfilment of knowledge, but are partial ignorance, Finite
beings are not able to give attention to the whole but
'•are the expression of an attention to this and this .
"
Whereas the Absolute has an inclusive eternal insight,
finite beings are but stages of the temporal process.
In all of these ways and in others, then, the finite has
only a very narrow outlook. The finite bt ing cannot
relate the whole. He cannot, therefore, find the solution
of many of the problems of the universe nor see the attain-
ment of purposes, the correction of errors or the overcoming
of defeats. It remains for the Absolute to supplement all
of his narrowness.
If, in the absolute, all of these limitations, --
ignorance, striving, defeat, error, temporality, and
narrowness, — are overcome, it is clear that the problem
of evil appears in a much different light from the Absolute
point of view. In fact, the problem of evil might well
be said to be overcome in the Absolute just insomuch as
these limitations of the finite mind are overcome and
supplemented. 100
(2) In the whole there is no abiding evil.
In the limited view which we have of the whole
of things, the divine Will appears to be still struggling

with evil. But this is the temporal and only a part of
the eternal Whole. From the final point of view
the Whole is good." We do not find anything that can
satisfy at any one temporal moment. "Yet the Eternal
Order is perfect." None of the evil or the striving for
perfection that we find in the part is to be found in the
Whole. The evil and the longing of the finite simply find
no place in the summation of all of the finite temporal
moments into the one eternal Whole because in the Whole
they are seen to be simply transitory.
(3) Kvil is a fetter imposed upon man by finitude.
Man is, in his best moods, ever pursuing an ideal.
"We are never content in the temporal present.... "5-°^
There is always a striving, a yearning. Evils have just
the same place in our lives as these unfilled desires for
the better and more complete.
Evil is a means of purging away the dross, but
man can never see its larger meaning. To thus suffer from
such short-sightedness and to feel defeat because we cannot
see the overcoming in the whole time- span of our lives is
the pang caused by finite vision. If man had a larger
outlook, he would see what he looks on as unmitigated evils,
blended into a more perfect whole, but man "cannot jump
out of his skin:" he is finite.
(4) Viewed in the whole of time evil does not have any
continued existence.
The Absolute is unquestionably good according to
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Royce, and, if one could view the whole of things totmn
simul
, there would be nothing hut good,— no evil. One
might make clear the way in which Royce considers evil to
have a real existence in the time order by drawing a
distinction between evil and evils (though Royce does not
make this distinction). Evils exist, but evil does not
exist. All of the evils and all of the goods of the various
temporal moments are blended in the Absolute, in a simul
totura view of things, so that there remain neither goods
nor evils, but only the Absolute, the All in which evil
102is so thwarted and subordinated that the All is good.
In the light of the distinction which Royce makes
on the basis of temporal considerations, one can see how evil
(or, as we might say, evils ) exist and yet evil has no place
in the whole of things. Evil really has to be overcome
even in the Absolute; but it is not a matter of chance
victory. Evil will be overcome in the Absolute : the very
nature of the Absolute is such that it will.
3. The meaning and purpose of evil.
If, then, evil is to be overcome in the Absolute,
why is there evil at all? Evil exists because it is only
through it that the good may be of some worth. The evil
really serves to enrich the nature of the Whole.
Only through this inner victory over the evil that is
experienced as a conquered tendency does the good will
have its being. (103)
It is quite clear, therefore, that evil is not
something accidental or something which could be got along
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just as well without, but it is rather the only possible
means by which a good Whole which is not a colorless Whole,
and hence no Whole at all, can find its realization. There
must be something to be overcome if a good i& to be realized.
Hence, evil is the only way in which an Absolute which is
good can find its realization.
a. A way of perfecting the good.
Goodness is not mere innocence, but realized
insight.... the evil will is a conquered element in the
good will, and iB as such necessary to goodness. TT04)
The perfection which is God^ comes not from having no exper-
ience with evil,— no knowledge of it; but rather from being
the fulfilment of all of the longings of the whole temporal
order. There is never complete satisfaction in any temporal
fact because there is not completeness: it is in the internal
that there is perfected all that is best, and this best can
only come through the existence of a worse.
b. The moral use of evil.
There is the perfection of the world-order not only
through the overcoming of all of the natural evils and ills
of the world, but there is also the overcoming of that which
causes these natural evils: the evil will of finite individuals.
Because every evil brings its consequent ill to society, men
are brought to a realization of the need which there is for
the exertion of the good will for the overcoming of and the
atoning for the ill will of themselves and others. The ills
of life lead them to the realization of the highest thing in
life: loyalty to great ideals.
I
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IY. Criticism of Royce's Philosophy.
Every critic makes a somewhat different approach
to the man whom he is criticizing, and so there shall not
be any attempt in this thesis to suggest all of the criticisms
which have been given against Royce's philosophy. Those
who attack a man's philosophy variously suggest what they
consider to he the vulnerable points of his system. It
shall be the purpose of this thesis only to suggest some of
the main points of weakness or attack and some of the most
constructive points in Royce's philosophy primarily as
these bear upon the problem of evil or the more closely
associated themes.
It might be suggewted, without any elaborations,
that the very first point of criticism would logically
seem to be Royce's idealism: some find objection to any
idealistic system.
A. The criticism of his monism.
Possibly the monistic systems find their explan-
ation simply in the infirmity of the human mind, which
is helpless in the face of disorder and must find for
itself some unity or system in things. (105)
While this is not a valid criticism against monism,
it is suggested by some that monism simply results from "the
monistic impulse," as this tendency is described.
1. The usual criticism of monism.
Against Royce's position as a monist are offered
arguments which generally arise against monism. Monism is
generally opposed simply by showing that it is inadequate
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to account for the facts of the world as we have them.
We do not have just one principle in the universe; there
is also an opposing principle, argue some. Others say
that there are a material and a spiritual element, others
say that the v/orld can be explained only as a plurality.
Monism is generally opposed simply by showing the tenability
of some of these other positions and showing that one
principle in the universe cannot account for the variety
which is to be found. Arguments against monism originate
largely at this point. It may almost toe said that the
argument one gives is very often based on his particular
way of viewing the universe. Royce saw it as one. Others
see a unity as impossible or that an explanation on the
basis of the one is insufficient and unsatisfactory.
2. Criticism of Royce 's particular kind of monism.
a. Pantheistic.
It has been urged by the present writer that
Royce's position is not pantheistic. There are some who
say that this was logically his position. At least, there
is a pantheistic element; and, it may well be suggested
that anyone who undertakes a monistic position is in danger
of being branded a pantheist without a fair study being
given to his exact position.
There are certain difficulties in Royce* s position.
For instance, it may be asked,
.... how can an all-knowing raind include an experience
of my error and ray ignorance precisely as I experience

my error and ignorance, since the way in which I
experience them is conditioned upon their not being
the experience of an all-knowing mind? ( 106
)
Are error, natural evil, and all material objects
simply states of the divine consciousness? 107 It would
seem that unity in one Absolute would require this. And
yet, the difficulties into which this position leads are
obvious. Can the assigning of different tempos rectify
the situation and offer a satisfy ng solution to the
difficulty? Many of Royce'B critics are far from
convinced that it can.
Macintosh accuses Royce of going "directly from
subjective idealism to 'solipsism of the absolute.'"108
He took refuge in the latter to avoid the former.
b. Equivocal statements about the nature of God.
S. S. Carr says that he thinks that Royce gives
two or three definitions of God: that, on the basis of
the use of several meanings of God, Royce, Kant and others
had not had great difficulty in offering refutation to
the common sense objector. God, for example, may mean:
(1) the unity of the finite consciousness; (2) the general
principle of unity in the universe; (3) the popular notion
of Christian theism. 109 Kven though this objection does
not seem, per se , to be valid, it is quite true that Royce
is not clear about the relation between the Absolute and
God at all times. The reader will recall that the relation
of God to the Beloved Community was not at all clear: on
the contrary, there is difference of opinion as to what
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Royce intended the relationship to be. J. Ward says,
Professor Hoyce in fact, like only too many theists,
is guilty of vacillation between God and the Absolute
which Mr. Bradley we found quaintly comparing to the
futile efforts of a dog to follow two masters. (110)
liven though reasons have been shown for believing
that Hoyce 1 s position was that of theism, in fact, that of
Christian theism, it muBt be admitted that he is not altogether
clear at all times as to just what he intends to say about
God.
It has been urged by some that Royce • s parable of
the child's gift of roses to the kind leads us to the conclu-
sion that such an impersonal or supra- personal universe as
Hoyce argues for is "essentially unethical" in character. 3,11
c. Does not leave place for individuals.
Perhaps one of the most difficult points for
Royce, as well as for any monistic system, is to establish
an independent place for the individual person, and so
retain ethical responsibility to the individual. Yet Royce
said in hiB Conception of Immortality
,
"Individuals are,
as we are sure, the most real facts of our world."AAW
Are we going to allow the position of Royce which has
been described in the sections of this writing which deal
with the individual and moral evil? Has Royce made out
a satisfactory case for an individual who is free to choose,
who can affect the world order, whose free acts God does
not foreknow, and whose acts will be overcome, if evil,
but not controlled? Royce seeks to defend such a position
c(
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for the individual.
Certainly, we are not doing justice to Royce 1 8
treatment of the individual unless we consider the social
aspects of the individual. Considerable part of his argument
turns upon this point. 2. N. Merrington speaks of the
"purely social character of selfhood" for Royce This
is most notable in ffhe Problem of Christianity , but in
this as well as in other of his writings, Royce argues
that the self is in a world of selves; and, in relation
to atonement (the overcoming of the moral evil of indivi-
duals), the atoning is done by other selves ,-- not by God.
It must be admitted that Royce' s effort to show
the ethical detachment of the individual from the Absolute
amounted to an almost religious passion. Santayana gives
this rather hard criticism:
His conscience spoiled the pantheistic serenity of his
system; and what was worse (for he was perfectly aware
of the contradiction) it added a deep, almost remorse-
ful unrest to his hard life. What calm could there be
in the double assurance that it was really righ;t that
things should be wrong, but that it was really wrong
not to strive to right them? (114)
Whether or not the social character of selfhood, the element
of timeleseness (which Royce again appealed to) in the Absolute
and the carefulness of Royce* s logic can make out a case for
the individual in his absolute system, it must remain for
the individual critic to judge. Suffice it to say, that it is
a weak point in his system.
1
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B. Criticism of the timeless element in the absolute.
Macintosh urges this objection against Royce:
Koyce's conception of an all- inclusive rational
Experience is not only theoretically untenable....;
as a static super-temporal totality of all reality,
it is never at any time an existent reality at all.
This Professor Royce himself was forced to admit.... (115)
This objection seems to weigh quite heavily against Royce 1 s
conception of the Absolute as timeless. How can that exist
in a wholeness of time which has no existence at any one
specific time, as a matter of fact, I think that Royce
meant to say that the Absolute did have an existence in
temporality,-- an existence in becoming. Royce urges that
any one point of time was an incomplete view of the whole,
so that the Absolute in any one point of time is incomplete.
oomewhat along this line is the criticism which
Ward gives of Royce 1 s analogy of the symphony, v/ard points
out that a symphony can only be grasped after it has been
completed. If, then, the Absolute comprehends at one glance
th« whole world order, it must be because the temporal
order is fixed. The world's evolution is then only a rehear-
sal after the symphony has been played. Ward then concludes:
But such an absolute One.... has no need and leaves no
place for a real Many at all. (116)
It may be urged against Ward that no one considers an analogy
as a perfect representation of his thought. For Royce,
"eternal knowledge" is "possible only in the general, and
of the casually predetermined, and not of the unique and
free.
"
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Royce goes on to say,
And as there is an eternal knowledge of all individuality,
and of all freedom, free acts are known as occuring like
the chords in the musical succession, precisely when and
now they actually occur. (117)
After reading such a passage as this from Royce, one feels
that there is, nevertheless, something on the side of Ward.
Royce's statement is vague and leaves a hit of uncertainty
as to whether he has successfully made out his point. He
seems arbitrary in his treatment of time, and determinism.
Again, the individual critic will simply have to approach
Royce for himself and judge for himself whether Royce has
made out his point in a manner which has sufficient precision
for its acceptance. There is certainly some point to his
distinction, which is much superior to the old Calvinistic
id6a of predestination or modern determinism. Royce's
argument cannot be passed by so superficially. In the face
of the rather indefinite discussions of time and eternity
which the best philosophies have to offer, . Royce • s position
cannot be lightly set aside
.
C. Criticism of the Theory of Evil.
As to just how well Royce succeeded in absolving
his Absolute from responsibility for the evil in the world
his critics are not agreed. Has the locating of the Absolute
in a different tempo from man been satisfactory on this point
or is it simply an imaginative flight which, in its final
analysis, will not stand the severer tests of logic and the
data of experience?
(
72.
Santayana's criticism in this connection is
interesting. He says:
To the old problem of evil Royce could only give an
old answer, altho he rediscovered and repeated it for
himself in many ways, since it was the core of his
whole system. Good, he said, is essentially the
struggle with evil and the victory over it; so that
if evil did not exist, good would be impossible.... (118)
To be sure, it was an old answer, but did Royce give any new
aspect of it? The present writer has suggested that he did.
When it came to moral evil Royce was very emphatic.
However, it has been suggested that Royce never did consider
the matter of blame as of very great importance* M. R. Cohen
says
:
.... He never attached great importance to the question
of blame or the free and intentional nature of sin....
"the solidarity of mankind links the crimes of each
to the sorrows of all." (119)
Truly Royce gave primary importance to the social effects
of sin and the solidarity of the community of beings. He
was much more concerned, it must also be admitted, with the
atonement to be made for the sin than with the sin itself.
His emphasis was on the need for loyal men, not the wicked-
ness of the sins of the weak. It might almost be suspected
that he recognized that men could not be held so greatly
accountable in a world where evil must be,^-2^ but he was
convinced that there was a place for moral exertion, for
moral heroes, for strong men to atone and help in the
overcoming of the evil. In fact, Royce's was almost entirely
a positive accent. Evil was; it was to be overcome; in the
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overcoming of it was good: this was what really mattered.
1. The doubtfulness of the possibility of a Y/hole which
is good with parts which are evil.
There are some specific points of Royce 's treat-
ment of evil which receive special criticisms. First of all,
it is objected that nothing which contains evil in itself
can be entirely good. Royce opposes this criticism by
saying that the Whole would not be either complete or fully
conscious nor yet would it have any of its richness of
content, it it were merely an Absolute of innocence in
which nothing had been accomplished, no opposition and evil
overcome. It is through this V6ry overcoming of evil that
the goodness of the Absolute is perfected.
Royce' s answer does not satisfy all of his critics.
2. The illusory «lement in evil.
Royce Baid that evil was not an illusion, but some
say that, of necessity (from his system) that was just what
it was. Royce says that evil has a real existence in the
time order; that there are real evils, and that they must be
met and conquered. In the eternal order they are not
illusory in character; they are that which has been overcome.
3. Unsatisfactory use of the element of eternity.
Many do not think that the time distinctions which
Royce draws are valid. This has been discussed previously
in this thesis. Unless the status which Royce gives to th6
concept of eternity is valid, his treatment of evil will not
t(
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stand alone without serious damaging. How can something be
temporally evil and eternally good? some have asked. A thing
cannot he both good and evil: it mast be one or the other.
A cannot be both A and not-A . Eternity is just a blind for
the issue and does not offer a valid means for solution of
the problem.
D. More favorable criticisms.
W. K . Wright does not find that Royce's view is
a vicious determinism, nor is he ready to criticize the
monistic approach to the world which is to be found in
Hoyce . He rather treats of Koyce * s position as simply
one which contrasts with James' view of an external and
121limited God. A Koyce ' s view is closely reasoned: most
certainly a possible vie?/. In his book, A Student '
s
Philosp phy of Religion
,
Wright not only speaks of "Josiah
Royce's brilliant conception of God"-^2 but he also adds
this note
:
Royce's treatment of the problem of freedom from the
standpoint of Absolute Idealism appears to the author
so admirable in every way that he has not supplemented
it with the interpretations of other writers of the
school. (123)
Miss Calkins also treats with Royce's views
sympathetically and follows him very closely, she says
that "she has been strongly influenced by Royce, though
diverging from him at not a few points. "I24 Royce has
presented a view, she thinks, which is acceptable as theistic
as well as a view which gives a satisfactory account of the
world order.
r<
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Many others, who do not prejudice themselves
against Royce' s philosophy at his first worli of Absolutism
or his indifference at the first as to whether his system
is pantheistic or not, find that there is a reasonable
and impressive system presented by Royce even though they
wish to take issue with it at some of its points and may
not be satisfied with a monistic approach as the one which
gives the best answer to their queries into the nature of
things.
K. Personal reflections.
It seems to the present writer that Royce's
system cannot be refuted by simply attacking it at its
weakest points, finding it objectionable at these, and
then condemning the whole position. There are difficulties
in it. How, for instance, can God be all and yet the call
to moral loyalties have any weight at all? On the other
hand, how can we be sure thb-t there is a God who can make
his purposes realized in the world unless he is omnipotent, -
or unless, in fact, he is all? In this event, even if we
could be more capable of loyalties, we would be less certain
that they are worth while. If God were not all might, then,
in our moral world, there might be nothing more than might
makes right. In short, every system has its difficulties.
If some minds find satisfactory answer to the problem of
ontology by seeing the world as a unity, then Royce has
offered a modern, and, at least in the opinion of the writer
r
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a quite acceptable philosophical system.
Again, it seems to the present writer that it
simply depends upon whether one chooses to begin with a
unity and work around to a way of giving individuation
and ethics justification or whether he thinks that his
philosophizing ought to start with the pluralism of
experience and then endeavor to fit in a unity of purpose
and a Supreme power capable of working out his purpose
in the universe, as to whether or not he will find Royce'
s
system to his tastes.
At present the system of Royce is not in very
good repute as a system, and I think that this is largely
due to the lack of unification in the present life and
living of men. We live in a generation of great democracy.
Perhaps the present tendencies are mort final than the
tendency to monistic thinking.
F. Summary of the contributions which Royce has made
1. In general.
However much one may disagree with a system, he
must at least admit that every great man who gives himself
to philosophic speculation makes some contribution if he is
at all original. Royce claimed only a relative originality.
Royce argued well for the idealistic position. He
urged that "the wise shall live by postulates:" otherwise
we are led to complete skepticism. He presented his case
for a "moral insight" and the need of organizing one's life
on the basis of it.
(
Royce gave an argument for the existence of God
from the existence of error, or better, from the fact
(positing idealism) that truth must he and must exist in
a mind which is omniscient. Royce himself insisted on
making the proof of the existence of error the method of
validating this argument.
Royce did much to bring his absolutism to a
personalistic position.
Royce pointed out the important turn which
philosophy may take according to the way the elements of
time and eternity are treated.
2. In his theory of evil.
Royce did a great deal to establish the reality
of evil in an absolutistic system. Moreover, he was never
so concerned about his absolutism that he was willing to
ignore the existence of moral evil.
Royce' s principle of loyalty has been a great
contribution. The world is not at all what it ought to
be. There are failures, especially when we speak of the
moral realm. There is the need of moral heroes, of earnest
living. The principle of atonement is a real and vital
process in the temporal world. Through it there is eternal
triumph. We are indebted to Royce for the strong ethical
note which his absolutism did not prevent him from sounding.
Royce leaves with us the question as to whether
or not the principle of time and eternity may not, in some
degree greater than we have been accustomed to think, affect
c
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the problem of evil. Kvil is certainly to be found in
the world in which we live but which men earnestly desire
may not be eternal.
(
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Summary
.
The problem and method of the thesis are ex-
plained in the introduction. A study of Hoyce's Absolute
and his treatment of the problem of individuation are
selected as an approach to the problem of evil in Hoyce's
philosophy. A condensed bibliography for a study of this
subject is given in the introduction.
Hoyce's conception of the Absolute is one of the
fundamental points of his system of philosophy. He adhered
to it with an almost religious tenacity even though he
adapted his philosophy to meet other changes in his thought
modes.
There is a transcendental element in Hoyce's
Absolute even though it is not the most important character-
istic of his Absolute. The Absolute possesses a perspective
in time which the finite does not have. It is by the eternal
insight of the Absolute that the Absolute is able to "rise
above finite details and hold them in perspective." 126
The Absolute is a larger whole of experience wherein is the
solution of all of the problems of finite limitations,
ignorance and error. Goodness iB also a point at which
the Absolute transcends the finite: the Absolute is entirely
good.
There is an even broader sense in which Hoyce's
Absolute is immanent. The Absolute includes the whole
natural order and man. Hoyce so insists on this at some
points that it makes his thought seem pantheistic.
3
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Royce says that the Absolute feels with man hat yet it
does not have any of the finite limitations of man.
Royce 's clearest advance toward theism is the
attribution of fuller personality to his Absolute. 127
His Absolute comes to have selfhood in a very real sense,
to have feeling and will as well as thought. The author
of this thesis holds that Koyce did not mean to identify
his Absolute with the Beloved Community of his later
thought. 128 Royce came more certainly to an identifica-
tion of his Absolute with the God of Christian tradition
in his later writings. His philosophy appears to be theism.
It was with difficulty that Royce could "find in
129
the world of the absolute elbow room for the individual.
Kven thought Royce did succeed reasonably well in establishing
a moral autonomy for the individual, he never quite got away
from the subordination of the individual to the Absolute,
and so his Absolute did not suffer very greatly in his
efforts to find a larger place for the individual in his
system of thought. It was the moral consciousness of Royce
which responded to those criticisms of his philosophy which
purported to show that there was no place for individual
effort, by indicating the place which the individual could
have in his absolutistic philosophy. The result was that
there were some decidedly different emphases in his later
philosophy.
The problem of evil occupies a very important
place in the philosophy of Royce. He designed an argument
ir
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for the existence of G-od taking as his starting point the
reality of error. Royce found evil in finitude, and so in
the individual 1 © will. Indeed, his insistence on the
reality of evil was almost a natter of religion with him.
He stressed the need of individual effort for the overcoming
of evil.
Kvil in the parts is a necessary condition of a
good whole. Without the struggle toward the ideal, life
would have no goal, and no real goodness, Evil is a real
element in the perfection of character. It is subservient
to a higher good. Although evil occupies an essential place
in the world order, man is not relieved from moral responsi-
bility. Sin is a reality. It is treachery to what we know
to be noble and honest. Loyalty is the great moral force
of the universe; loyalty to loyalty is a good in itself.
When a man iB not loyal to ideals, he harms himself and the
whole community. All moral evil must have its atonement;
when atonement has been made the result is a world which
is even better off than it was at the first. Royce makes
an appeal for moral earnestness.
Evil is a reality; it is part of a great world
harmony. Evils are as the discordant notes which appear in a
symphony. Partial evil is universal good. Royce does not
think that the theories that evil is an illusion, or a means
to good, or necessary by way of contrast, or that it results
from the free-will of moral agents, are satisfactory. He
insists upon the absolute goodness of the Whole as necessary
9
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if the world is to oe considered the work of an Infinite
Reason. Bat the character of the Whole is not like that of
the part. Evil is included in the Absolute inasmuch as the
Absolute includes it as part of its goodness and also in that
the Absolute shares in the suffering of human beings. This
is indicative of the fact that evil and suffering are not
ultimate, but are simply parts of a larger Whole. The Absolute
is eternal, and the eternal order does not have linked to it
the ills and evil of the temporal order. The Absolute rises
high above the finite limitations and the evil of the finite.
Evil does not have any continued existence when it is viewed
in the whole span of time,— in an eternal perspective.
Evil, we find to be a means of perfecting the good. It gives
worth and meaning to the Whole.
Royce has been criticized first of all for his
absolutistic position. Monism has been called in question
by man, and Royce 1 s position is subject to the special
criticisms made against it as being pantheistic and not
allowing sufficient place for the individual. It is not
to be denied that there are difficulties in the way of his
views, but an attempt has been made to show that his position
is a carefully organized and reasonable one.
The validity of the basic distinction which Royce
draws between time and eternity has been called in question.
Royce 's treatment of the question is, nevertheless, worthy
of thoughtful consideration.
If
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Critics are not agreed as to how well Royce
succeeded in his treatment of the problem of evil. Is
his just the old answer to the problem, a resolving of
evil into illusion? This criticism can hardly he sus-
tained, and yet his position has elements which meet v/ith
strong objections from some. Hoyce argued strongly for
moral evil, but there are those who question whether he
left place for the free-will which is a prerequisite for
the reality of moral evil.
There are other critics who consider Royce's
one of the best statements of absolutism which has been
made. M. W. Calkins finds his view a very acceptable one.
In spite of the difficulties of some of the
points in Royce's system, it is urged by the present
writer that his system is worthy of careful consideration.
There are distinct contributions which his system of
thinking has made in the field of philosophy.
((
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71. Royce, "The Second Death," Atlantic Monthly , 111 (1913),
408, column 1.
72. Ibid., 415, column 1.
73. Ibid., 413, column 2.
74. Problem of Christianity , vol. I, pp. 298-299.
75. Ibid., pp. 306-307. Cf. also pp. 302, 304.
76. Ibid., pp. 307-308.
77. Ibid., p. 322.
78. Ibid., p. 323.
(
88.
79. Problem of Christianity
, vol. I, pp. 322-323.
80. Ibid., p. 315.
81. World and the Individual
, vol. II, p. 374.
82. Royce, "The Second Death, ,f 415-416.
Ilotes on Natural Kvil .
83. Religions Aspects of Philosophy
, p. 264.
84. Studies of Good and Kvil , pp. 5-28, gives concisely
Royce ' 8 treatment of the main views which have been
taken toward the problem of evil.
85. World and the Individ aal , vol. I, p. 374.
86. This is the problem of Job: Studies of Good and Kvil,
chapter I, "The Problem of Job," especially pp. 1-5.
87. "/or Id and the Individual , vol. I, p. 270.
88. Ibid., p. 457.
89. Ibid., p. 242.
90. Royce, Conception of Immortality
, p. 64; also World
and the Individ aal , vol. II, p. 302.
91. World and the Individ aal
.
vol. II, p. 364.
92. Ibid., p. 299.
93. Ibid., p. 408.
94. Ibid., p. 125.
95. Cohen, "Philosophy of Josiah Royce," Hew Republic
.
8 (1916), 265, column 2.
96. World and the Individual , vol. II, p. 409.
97. Ibid., p. 389.
98. Ibid., p. 138; cf. also p. 386. "The Temporal Order,
when taken in its wholeness, is to as identical with
the Ktemal Order."
99. P. 151.
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100. Cf. Woria and the Individual
, vol. II, pp. 302-303.
101. Ibid., p. 1E4.
102. Cf . Studies of Good and Evil
, pp. 28 and 25.
103. Religious Aspects of Philosophy
, p. 452.
104. Ibid., p. 456.
IV. Uote s on Criticism *
105. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy
, p. 255.
106. Macintosh, The Reasonablene ss of Christianity
, p. 183.
107. Cf. Johnson, "Josiah Koyce : Theist or Pantheist."
108. The Problem of Knowledge
, p. 166. Cf. also p. 386.
109. Carr, "Hoyce's Philosophy of Religion," Bibliotheca
Sacra
.
71 (1914), 285.
110. The_ Realm of Ends .
111. Seth, A Study of Kthical Principles
, p. 452.
(The parable to which reference is made may be found
in Royce's Religious Aspe cts of Philosophy
, p. 483.)
112. P. 30.
113. The Problem of Personality
, pp. 180 and 185.
114. Character and Opinion in the United State
s
.
p. 126.
115. The Rg aspnableness of Christianity
, p. 223.
116 IM. Kfl aim of Ends , p. 315. See also pp. 314-315.
117. V/orld and the Individual , vol. II, p. 374.
118. Character and Opinion in the United States , p. 105.
119. Cohen, "On American Philosophy: the Idealistic
Tradition and Josiah Royce," Hew Republic
.
20 (1919),
150, column 1.
120. Cf., however, his chapter on "Atonement" in The
Problem of Christianity , vol. I, chapter ¥1.
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121. Cf . A Student's Philosophy of Keligion
. pp. 376-390.
122. P. 382.
123. P. 462.
124. Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 45, note.
125. Cf . Religions Aspects of Philoso phy
, p. xii.
126. Johnson, "Josiah Koyce : Theist or Pantheist," p. 202.
127. Ihid., p. 201.
128. Cf. pp. 17-19.
129. Bakewell, "2rue Philosopher," p. 462, column 3.
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